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Paradigms for Clinical Ethics Consultation Practice
Abstract
Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who "do" bioethics in community and
university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation and home care settings, and some (though quite a few
less) who play the role of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and
genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically active bioethicists actually
do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards,
credentials, "certification" exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged in clinical consultation.
Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical ethics consultation
practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What do clinical ethicists do, how and where do
they do it, and what kind of clinical ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings?

Comments
© Cambridge University Press 1998. Reprinted from Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 7,
Issue 3, July 1998, pages 308-314.
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0963180198703111

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/44

Paradigms for Clinical Ethics
Consultation Practice
MARK D. FOX, GLENN McGEE, and ARTHUR CAPLAN

Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who “do”
bioethics in community and university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation
and home care settings, and some (though quite a few less) who play the role
of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and
genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically
active bioethicists actually do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards, credentials, “certification”
exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged in clinical consultation.
Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical
ethics consultation practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What
do clinical ethicists do, how and where do they do it, and what kind of clinical
ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings?
While various authors have identified roles for clinical ethicists1–6 as well as
methods for training them,7–11 the literature has paid little attention to the wide
variance in bioethical practice engendered by differences in settings. A detailed
analysis of actual clinical ethics practice, however, must surely be performed
before any decision can be reached about how clinical ethics should be integrated into clinical practice in hospitals. To contribute to such an analysis by
providing paradigms for further study, we have examined the practice of ethics
consultation in our own medical centers, Vanderbilt University and the University of Pennsylvania. We conclude that it is not the training or ethical
orientation of the clinical ethics provider, but the practice setting in which he or
she works, that determines the role and usefulness of the clinical ethicist.
We have identified three different kinds of clinical ethics practice. While each
has its attendant problems, we argue that clinical ethics providers need to be
situated in ways that make them accountable for patients and for clinical
practice, and may even need to be identified as members of clinical teams.
The Generalist: The Ethicist At-Large
The first kind of practice setting we identified is also, we suspect, the most
common. The clinical ethicist at-large provides services to an entire hospital. A
generalist of sorts, he may be called to consult on virtually any hospital unit,
from pediatrics to neurosurgery. As a result, he must be prepared to encounter
a broad array of ethical issues. The clinical bioethicist at-large thus resembles
The authors acknowledge Jennifer Klocinski and Silke-Maria Weineck for research and editorial
assistance.
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the generalist physician in that he must be acquainted with various fields of
clinical endeavor; unlike the at-large physician, however, the at-large ethicist is
expected to be equally adept in all units of the hospital.
The role of the at-large ethicist corresponds to the early images of the clinical
ethics consultant presented by both Purtilo12 and Glover, Ozar, and Thomasma.13 Two fundamental assumptions underlie these characterizations: 1) that
the at-large ethicist has no special affiliation or allegiance to a particular clinical
unit, and 2) that the presence of the at-large ethicist in a particular unit has
been prompted by a specific request.
Our observation suggests that the at-large clinical ethics consultant resembles
the Lone Ranger. He arrives on the scene to solve a particular case, unfamiliar
with the relationships or clinical practice of the unit. After the problem is
solved, the ethicist leaves, but is always ready to reappear in the unit in
response to a new crisis.
The Unit Ethicist: Ethics on Retainer
A second role for clinical ethics corresponds to Agich’s model of the “watcher,” 14
derived originally from social scientists studying aspects of hospital culture for
documentation. Watching an entire hospital proved a nearly impossible proposition since the hospital is comprised of numerous unique clinical communities with different protocols, policies, and medical parameters. In their wake,
clinicians and ethicists began to surmise that differences among these communities and their practices might engender different ethical implications.
Since different hospital units have different needs, some hospital units requested
the participation of ethicists in teaching and consulting capacities more often
than others; these concentrations began to prompt a closer affiliation between
bioethicists and particular units. For example, the Baby Doe trials and tribulations led our neonatal units to think carefully about their procedures for discontinuation of life support; many brought ethicists into regular conversations
about cases. These ethicists stopped by regularly to visit, even attended daily
rounds. As the ethicist became more familiar with the unit (and vice versa), his
contributions became more proactive. Rather than waiting for the surgeon or
neonatologist to identify an issue or punt a case to the ethics committee, the
ethicist began to identify cases before they became controversial. Thus, his contributions went subtly beyond “watching” as he ventured to offer opinions
about generalized approaches to particular treatments or to general problems
in the unit, e.g., communication among staff or with families.
When such an arrangement becomes formalized, the practice of unit-based
ethics begins. We use this term to denote a predominant, if not exclusive,
commitment from an ethicist to be available to a particular unit and competent
regarding issues that might characteristically be faced in that setting.
The unit-based ethicist may fulfill a variety of functions through his participation in the working or teaching rounds of the unit. One corresponds to
Agich’s “watcher,” though the term “learner/watcher” may be more appropriate. While for Agich the “features of disinterestedness and objectivity are crucial” 15 to the watching enterprise, the unit-based ethicist as learner/watcher
has additional concerns. Participation in rounds provides the occasion not simply to study the practice of medicine as Agich’s watcher would, but also to
develop skills of clinical discernment and a familiarity with clinical medicine
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that also allows the ethicist to learn more about the clinical care of a specific
patient population.
The unit-based ethicist may also be what Agich calls a “witness,” serving to
“establish or ratify the moral community that defines the practice in question” 16 without actually becoming a part of the community. The witness’s presence is never quite accepted: he participates in the unit’s routine without being
socialized into its purposes. The ambiguity of this role can be quite taxing for
the ethicist; he is not entitled to the enthusiasm of the unit as it perfects its
techniques, yet he is a de facto comrade, learning and developing relationships.17–18
The relationship between unit and ethicist resembles a retainer. When lawyers are put on retainer, they are paid to take a long-term interest in their
client’s legal defense. This arrangement allows them to be proactive, inoculating their client against future problems. By analogy, the unit ethicist begins to
represent the interests of the unit in several ways. He begins to “matter,”
gathering responsibilities toward the unit itself that exceed those common in
business consulting or ethics at-large. However, like the lawyer on retainer, the
unit ethicist accrues only limited responsibility. Unlike accountants, lawyers
and unit-based ethicists cannot be held legally responsible for their clients’
actions; the execution of representation itself must be deficient or malpractical.
Ethicist for a Clinical Team: The Team Player
The multidisciplinary team represents the emerging paradigm in patient care.
Transplantation has led the way by bringing together surgeons, nurses, social
workers, ethicists, chaplains, psychologists, and internists to care for patients
needing transplantation. The transplant team directs the care of its patients
regardless of the unit to which they are admitted. For instance, the heart
transplant team manages the care of patients from end-stage heart disease
through the peri-operative period and into life after transplantation. The team
may operate on a consensus model, in which everyone has a stake in patient
care and the success of the practice. As ethicists become involved in evaluation
of patients for transplantation, or genetic testing, to offer another example, they
have become members of these clinical teams.
It is our contention that these ethicists are forging a new conception of
clinical ethics: the team player. In contrast to the other models discussed, the
team player enters into a kind of essential affiliation with the purposes and
protocols of the team. This affiliation is controversial. Some may deny emphatically that they are part of the team, or are ethicists for the team, opting instead
to describe their role in a way that seems to denote the “unit” or “at-large”
practice setting. Indeed, the team ethicist may necessarily face basic conflicts of
interest: to study the team while occasionally offering advice seems to violate
the nondirectiveness so central in social science research, and criticism of the
team’s activities may interfere with integrated membership in the team. Possibly, this fear has prevented early assimilation of the team model for ethics.19
In team meetings, the ethicist may serve to clarify the values that shape the
processes of policy development or patient selection. However, the team ethicist’s involvement is not limited to the conference table. The transplant team
ethicist, for example, moves from the conference room to the wards with the
team through its various activities and physical settings; the team represents
his primary affiliation.
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Evaluating Clinical Ethics Practice
The description of each of these models is based on observation and analysis of
clinical ethics practice in our own institutions. Each model offers its own advantages, though some may be conceptually or practically more limiting than
others. For example, the model of bioethicist at-large allows ethicists to be
available to the whole of the hospital for a relatively insignificant cost; access to
ethics consultation is allowed to follow demand. There are significant problems, however.
First, in a large hospital setting, the ethicist is a stranger not only to the
patient, but also to most healthcare providers. The last thing the patient wants
in a large hospital setting is another strange consultant with dubious accountability and little demonstrable long-term interest in the patient. The ethics
consultant appears as an outside expert rather than as that member of the team
who is actively working on ethics issues. Moreover, even the most thoughtful
clinical ethicist will have to cope not only with the fact that different clinical
settings produce different ethical problems, but also that general ethical concepts are often inadequate when it comes to assessing subtle ethical issues
arising in specific clinical contexts. Futility in the rehabilitation unit differs
from futility in trauma settings. Informed consent and the determination of
competency take on unique dimensions in pediatrics. Radiology plays host to a
range of questions about conflict of interest that do not beset oncologists.
Unfamiliar with the particularities of each setting, the generalist must rely on
all-purpose theoretical ethics. The “application” of theoretical ethics, however,
is a complex process of identifying values and clarifying assumptions within a
specific context that cannot be reduced to a set of simple principles like autonomy, beneficence, justice, nonmaleficence, fidelity, or confidentiality. Conversely, a bioethicist who finds none of her general principles applicable to a
particular case may miss moral implications merely because she has too little
knowledge of the history of moral issues in the unit.
A practice of bioethics based on a stance of acontextual application of values
is deeply flawed. Agich,20 Zaner,21 McGee,22 and Kane and Caplan23 and others
have shown that specific cases may require something akin to the casuist’s
flexibility of orientation, or the phenomenologist’s questioning of context. If
practitioners receive the same mantra in response to any clinical quandary, no
matter how unique or unusual, they may become suspicious of the need for
ethical deliberation altogether.
The second set of problems facing the generalist arises from the fact that her
service is largely crisis oriented. Ethics consultation happens during or after a
breakdown of conversation; it is accompanied by a sense of “dilemma.” The
consultant thus conducts “trauma” ethics — working in a tense and perhaps
alien territory while under pressure to resolve a crisis. Since the duration of the
ethicist’s consultation is limited to the crisis, her ability to pursue additional
educational efforts to proactively avert such crises in the future may be limited.
Third, the structure of this consultative arrangement suggests that the physicians, nurses, and other staff invite the ethicist as an “expert” consultant. But
is that an accurate and appropriate way of captioning ethical expertise and
deliberation in the hospital? The posture of applying theoretical principles from
the outside, as it were, sends the message that clinical practice and ethics are
two different, independent enterprises. We argue below that the turn to outside
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experts is inappropriate. Unlike a nephrology consult, successful ethical practice does not easily fit in the consultative paradigm: it requires more than a
15-minute discussion.
By contrast, both team and unit-based ethicists operate within stable networks of relationships with healthcare providers. The ongoing nature of these
relations gives credence to the understanding of clinical ethics consultation
(and education) as a process. Rather than particular patient care issues being
viewed as obstacles to be hurdled or problems to be solved, difficult cases can
be understood in the context of the continuous moral development of the
various professionals involved. Furthermore, the continuous involvement of
unit and team ethicists may convince healthcare providers that ethics are not
specialists’ concerns. Instead, the ethicist in the unit or on a team may foster a
sense of shared responsibility among all the healthcare providers.
Their preventive, proactive potential is perhaps the most important advantage of both unit- and team-based ethics. Forrow, Arnold, and Parker24 note
several features of the preventive medicine model that may also benefit the
practice of ethics. First, preventive ethics seeks to anticipate ethical issues,
“recognizing predictable patterns through which common ethical dilemmas
develop.” 25 It furthermore stresses the need to articulate personal and institutional values that affect patient care: “the earlier the parties identify and (where
possible) resolve [value] differences, the less likely these differences are to
develop into conflicts that adversely affect clinical care.” 26 The regular presence
of the ethicist may serve to foster an attention to ethical issues that, in turn,
may lead to earlier and better communication among staff or team members as
well as with patients and families regarding potential sources of value conflict,
possibly averting the eruption of moral conflicts.
A subtler advantage of the unit- and team-based practices over the at-large
model is their inherent commitment to the particularity of each case, each unit,
or each clinical specialty.27 The unit-based ethicist recognizes that the specific
histories, cultures, lives, and professional practices of clinicians, patients, and
families produce subtle moral configurations rather than dilemmas to be solved
by general principles. Thus, unit ethicists recognize the practical and moral
significance of the unit’s distinct medical and personal context.
The unit-based model, however, comes with its own disadvantages. While its
retainer structure can be advantageous from the perspective of the ethicist as
disinterested “watcher,” it is also potentially dangerous when the ethicist loses
sight of important discrepancies between his role and that of a lawyer on
retainer: the lawyer is able to provide a fiduciary, confidential relationship of
advocacy because it is clear whom she represents. By contrast, the ethicist is not,
in the final analysis, clearly wed to any particular part or person of the unit —
unlike doctors, nurses, and even social workers who have clear lines of representation accompanied by professional pledges of beneficence or care or advocacy.
In consequence, the unit may see the ethicist as an outsider, brought in to
perform nothing but seeking out moral deficiency. At the same time, those on
the outside will strongly associate the unit-based ethicist with the practices and
problems of the unit, even if he conceives of himself as a consultant to the unit
rather than as a member of its staff. Thus, he runs the risk of being perceived
as “moral policeman” within the unit, and its “lackey” outside it.
Nonetheless, the unit-based ethicist may be positioned more comfortably
here than in either of the other models we observed; her work is not encum312
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bered by the problematic distance from the clinical decisionmaking process that
plagues the “drop-in” generalist, nor does she run the potential risks of increased
accountability facing the team-ethicist who effectively integrates into the purposes of the team itself.
Team ethicists, by contrast, are conceptually affiliated to the team. They can
more correctly be said to have purchase in their team’s decisions, including
those not directly related to ethics. This essential affiliation has the effect of
enlarging the practice of the team to include the ethicist and his or her practice.
The team ethicist’s presence is thus riskier than the consultative presence of the
unit ethicist, who is still viewed as a visitor on loan from the ethics world, and
much riskier than that of the at-large ethicist, who may be viewed as an ethical
firefighter from the central office.
The question becomes one of responsibility. The team ethicist has an overt, vested
interest in seeing the team succeed in its mission; he or she has in fact signed on
to that mission. This part ownership means that the ethicist is correctly culpable
when the team acts immorally. This enlarges his role in an interesting, problematic, and completely unstudied way. The ethicist says, “I am responsible for what
my team does,” which is more than being responsible for having given good advice. While this commitment advances the democratic nature of ethics’ role in clinical decisions, it also puts the ethicist in a potentially very difficult position. This
degree of involvement effectively abandons the “neutrality” or “applied ethics”
paradigms for consultation; it clearly requires that the ethicist have a level of clinical competence (that cannot be determined in advance). The ethicist must be more
than “mere” clinician or “mere” philosopher.
Conclusion: Toward the Future of Clinical Ethics
The practice of providing information and assistance by clinicians and others
functioning in clinical ethics roles has begun in our hospital to evolve beyond
the “consultancy” model into one in which ownership of the care of patients is
correctly acknowledged as a part of the practice of clinical ethics. That is good.
However, our observations of ethics consultation models pertain mostly to
tertiary care settings, which constitute the most-studied chunk of ethics consultation. The community hospitals that treat most patients may find the team
approach incompatible with the dominant modes of medical practice. In community hospitals, at-large ethics consultations may also be the only practicable
model, insofar as either the financial or the human resources may be lacking for
long-term involvement of ethicists or clinician-ethicists. In the smaller hospital
without training rotations, where a sense of immediacy among the units prevails, the at-large ethicist borrows the legitimacy of the chaplain or risk manager who has already established the possibility of an omnipresent discussion
of patient experiences and problems. The danger, though, is that the at-large
ethicist model will be construed by many ethics committees in community
settings to be so similar to risk management or chaplaincy as to combine those
two functions. This can create the serious conflict of interest problems we have
described.
Different roles are and should be appropriate for different settings. In exploring the issues raised by the expansion of clinical ethics into a variety of settings,
those in bioethics must remain sensitive not only to context, but also to method
and normative outlook in advocating particular models for clinical ethics.
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